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UNIFICATION

OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY

P
and "legal" are different words, and it
OLITICAL"
L
J7~is
possible that they refer to two disciplines whose
unification suggests subsuming one under the other
or treating them as co6rdinate branches of a "master science".
If we exclude the reduction of social data to their physical
components or external manifestations, as well as formal exercises designed to unify the social sciences by conventional use
of common terms regardless of the distinctiveness of problems,
we encounter such a disorganization in current thought as to
make it obvious that there are major obstacles in the way of
even a loose interrelation of legal and political theory.
In the writer's view of the present situation political theory
and legal theory do not exist as autonomous disciplines. Nor
can they be constructed into or developed as separate disciplines
unless arbitrary limitations are imposed, for example, that legal
theory be confined to the explication of legal rules and to their
logical manipulation, while political theory include all of social
science regarding relevant facts and values. The long tradition
of political valuation under the aegis of the natural law philosophies and the rise of sociology of law alone render such a
demarcation untenable and indicate that the problems met in
even a casual survey of legal theory and political theory cannot
be solved that way.
There are many other reasons for thinking that the present
division of knowledge into political theory and legal theory
represents an unsound bifurcation and that the most promising
endeavors lie in the direction of uniting these cognate bodies of
thought. Perhaps it may be assumed that efforts to do this
would profit from significant achievements in the social sciences
and that no mere application of ancient philosophies will suffice.
Having noted this caveat, the writer ventures to suggest,
without undue commitment to either Plato or Aristotle, that a
study of the problem in the context of these philosophers' work
would be profitable. No separation of legal from political
theory is found there, and in their analysis of problems the legal
15
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and the political coalesce as the subject matter of the "master
science" (for example, Aristotle's comment that the constitution
is "a way of life"). The pertinent question concerns the validity
of that perspective and its present significance rather than the
limitations of Greek social science, including those reflecting
the absence of a highly developed legal order.
The contrast in present legal and political theory is obvious
and some of the causes must be noted in an effort to achieve a
sound point of view regarding law-and that, in the writer's
opinion, is a necessary prerequisite to the solution of the problem
we are discussing. In this century and country vocationalism
has greatly influenced, if it has not wholly determined, the
functions of scholars designated "legal" or "political" in the
respective departments of the universities. For example, the
government curricula typically omit private law, procedure,
and even areas of important public law-and that is justifiable
only on vocational grounds. Vocationalism is so dominant in
the law schools that the solution of practical problems is emphasized even in jurisprudence. It seems evident that the
prevalent bifurcation in thinking has been influenced by the
vocational work of the scholars.
Equally operative in effecting the separation of legal from
political theory has been the accelerated specialization in social
science which began in the past century. It is impossible here,
however, to deal with the emergence of the various disciplines
or to consider the advantages of the specialization they represent.
Finally, the theory that law is only a distinctive form or type
of proposition, also dominant in the modern era, has allocated
the determination of legal meanings to one group of specialists
and has deterred nonlegal scholars from exploring them. At
the same time, with the support of a narrow empiricism, it has
induced the assumption that law is not important in behavioral
science. Thus, the far-ranging influence of formal theories of
law, specialization and vocationalism has largely determined
the present character of legal theory and political theory. Any
effort to unify them must find ways to surmount the consequent
barriers.
For those who hold that any body of knowledge is conditioned
by its subject matter and that the various sciences are distin-
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guishable in those terms, the discovery and definition of the
distinctive properties of a subject matter are of paramount
importance for the theory of the relevant discipline. For present
purposes one may recognize three kinds of definition-the
Humpty Dumpty definition, that of usage, and the descriptive
definition which specifies "essential" properties and is fully formulated at the end, rather than at the outset, of an inquiry.
The literature of political theory on the subject matter of the
discipline exhibits the use of all these types of definition, often,
unfortunately, without stipulation of what is being done.
Humpty Dumpty definitions are sometimes necessary in
scientific or philosophical enterprises where ordinary usage is
cloudy and knowledge of the realities must be postponed. But
a reckless coinage of terms handicaps the acquisition of knowledge by confusing verbal construction with analysis and theory.
In any case, the descriptive definition is the principal objective
of inquiry regarding the subject matter of the political discipline.
It should be sufficiently precise to facilitate research and, so far
as is possible without distortion, it should be stated in terms
which promote the organization of the relevant knowledge.
It is widely recognized that various current efforts to define
the political field have met with an indifferent success. One
common ''approach" is that power is the political subject matter.
But power, unqualified and unspecified, is one of the vaguest
notions in the history of human thought, and one need only
note the ramifications of potentiality as distinguished from
actuality in Aristotle's metaphysics, alone, to apprehend the
range of problems raised and unsolved by venturing in that
direction. That perspective, moreover, is apt to intrude physicalist or biological assumptions and to ignore problem-solving
intended to discover the "right" laws rather than to dominate.
The notion is thus fostered that the political situation is correctly
represented in the image of a dominating leader manipulating
stupid or cowering "subjects". But disinterested efforts to
discover what is really wanted and what ought to be done and
the answers implemented in functioning legal systems reveal
the more enduring, significant aspects of power relations.'
1 "Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties.
John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Book II, Ch. 1.
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Another approach is that the subject matter of the political
discipline is decision-making. There is a significant degree of
relevance in this generalization just as there is in the one considered above but, again, the avoidance of law results in a vague
notion which apparently includes attendance at a baseball
game, by-laws of unions and corporations, participation in
church activities, decrees of ecclesiastical authorities, criminal
behavior, and the judgments of courts of law. If inquiry were
limited to rational processes, as the term "decision-making"
suggests, there would be a failure to take account of custom and
habituation in the moral virtues manifested in hardly conscious
correct action, as well as of self-interest, lack of information,
and bias. Nor is the knowledge required to construct the
discipline rendered more attainable by confusing the processes
involved in learning legal ways with those involved in discovering
sound laws and those involved in adjudication and those involved
in law enforcement.
Similar doubts arise regarding the thesis that the authoritative
allocation of values is the subject matter of the political discipline.
Difficulties concerning the meaning of "authority", alone, and
the effort to define that in terms of acceptance of an obligation
to obey merely raise many problems, which could probably be
solved in good measure by precise analysis which recognized
that law is an essential component of the political process, and
included careful efforts to distinguish laws from other norms.
The above remarks are even more pertinent to the thesis that the
subject matter of politics is "the control relationships of wills."2
With reference to all of these approaches to the discovery and
definition of political data, it may be suggested that if something
other than law is intended in the above generalizations, their
authors should state clearly just what that other is, and why
law is omitted. If law is included, but something in addition
is intended, it is equally necessary to state what else is included
and why that is done. The principal limitation of such theorizing
is that it lacks definite relevance and the support of validated,
narrow generalizations because law has been ignored. Thus,
2 George E. G. Catlin, A Study of the Principles
p. 76.

of Politics

(New York, 1930),
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even though one might eventually employ similar theories, they
would have much greater significance if they rested on, and rose
from, the solid foundation of a precisely defined, distinctive
subject matter. While these remarks refer especially to certain
recent theories, they are also applicable to more historically
guided interpretations which have suffered from a neglect of
thorough study of legal ideas and their functions-with the result
that an unnecessary vagueness pervades the literature, and the
potentialities for systematizing the political discipline are not
developed.
The writer submits that the traditional view that the state
is the subject matter of the political discipline is basically sound.3
The correlative thesis that the state presupposes, or is identical
with, law, though involved in verbal difficulties and the uncertainties of anthropological studies, is also one of the most
widely held opinions in the history of political theory, beginning
with Plato's observation that without law there is no polity.
In the light of current attempts to discover and define the
subject matter of the political discipline without reference to
either state or law, it may not be superfluous to recall that
throughout the history of political theory, even in sweeping
challenges like those of Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and Hume,4
law was recognized as an essential component of political data.
It is conceivable that the history of political theory regarding
law represents an obsession with irrelevant or nonsensical abstractions but, apart from the weight of 2,300 years of precedent
and authority, the literature produced abounds in valuable
insights and critiques of political processes which can hardly
be displaced by wishful prognostications regarding a nonexistent
political science.
In addition to the evidence of the history of political theory
recognizing law among the essential components of political
3 It should be clear from the following discussion that the writer does not hold
that political science or theory should be limited to "the state".
4 "So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so
little dependence have they on the humors and tempers of men, that consequences
almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which
the mathematical sciences afford us." David Hume, Philosophical Works (Boston
and Edinburgn, 1854), vol. 3, pp. 12, 13.
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data, there is considerable knowledge of the formal organization
of many societies. The identification of law and state with
highly specialized official organs has retarded solution of the
problem whether the simplest preliterate peoples were without
law or whether the more persuasive view is ubi societas ibi jus.
But even those who withhold a "state" from preliterate societies
find law or other coercive norms among them; and, although
the consistency of that view may be doubted, it provides a
common ground so far as the present thesis regarding law is
concerned.
The principal point, however, is that it is not sufficient merely
to recognize that law is somehow or somewhere present among
political data. The needs of cogent theory are met only if law
is found to be "ultimate" and "essential" in political data.
Law is ultimate and essential in political data not for the collateral reason that it is impossible to reduce law to simpler
elements without destroying it but because law supplies and
comprises the distinctiveness of political data. In short-no
law, no political data.5
To secure an adequate hearing for this thesis it would be
necessary to place alleged instances of total personal domination
in actual contexts of sustaining legal orders-to consider, for
example, whether the historic Oriental despotisms rested on a
base of customary law, and to detail the facts of the recent and
current dictatorships, including that avowing the theory of the
withering away of the state-all of which preserved the Rechtsstaat throughout vast areas of interpersonal relations which did
not challenge the regime. The expansion of state and law in
Russia, as well as the liquidation of distinguished exponents of
the Marxian theory, is especially suggestive. The plain inference
is that law is necessary because order and security, the minimal
requirements of survival, not to speak of liberty and other values
of democratic societies, cannot be provided without law. The
testimony of the history of law and of political theory, of an6 "Legal action-we
may also call it 'political' for, as it will be argued later,
the political is also the legal, since the State is essentially law...."
Ernest
Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford and New York, 1951),
p. 45.
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thropology, and of current events may be merely collateral
evidence, but they are rather persuasive that law is an essential
component of political data. They provide some insight into
the primordial fact of law in enduring interpersonal relations.
From a directly theoretical viewpoint, law is ultimate and essential because it includes, if it does not consist only of, distinctive
ideas, that is, law is ultimate in political data because distinctive
ideas, supplied by law, are ultimate there. Until, therefore,
the search for a valid, adequate definition of political data is
pushed to the point where those ideas and their functions are
included, the basic properties of those data have not been apprehended.
There is still another way to recognize the place of law in
society and in the political discipline, namely, to think of the
political process in terms of social problems. In the literature
of sociology, social problems are apt to be given a merely practical
significance and such theory as is expended on them deals with
the articulation of assumed value judgments and the possibility
of improvement. What has been ignored is that social problenms
are legal problems. For, in so far as social problems are recurrent, more or less regular modes of dealing with them are sought,
that is, the solutions include sound laws, as is evident in the work
of the English Royal Commissions. For Plato the solution of
social problems and the consequent view of law as therapy are
subordinated to attainment of the highest type of wisdom exemplified in legal codes and constitutions. From both viewpoints law is "basic", and the inadequacy of that adjective and
its synonyms is the unavoidable consequence of contact with an
irreducible facet of social life.
If the state is the subject matter of political theory and if the
state presupposes law or is identical with law (though not in the
sense maintained in the Pure Theory of Law) or if state and
law are not thus related, but law is nonetheless recognized as an
essential phase of enduring social organization, then the most
important present task for theorists is to study the meaning and
functions of law from the vantage point of current social science.
This will certainly represent a great advance in comparison with
past political theory which accepted a restrictive view of law,
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for it will provide the modern social scientist with data and
theories with which he can work.
It would require a lengthy essay to present an adequate
theory of law, but the directions to be taken can be indicated.
We start from what is common ground for practically all theorists
from the Greeks to the current positivists, namely, that law
is expressed in a distinctive normative form composed of two
descriptive propositions, one designating a harm, the other, a
physical sanction, both being joined by a copula signifying must,
an imperative "shall". The second step concerns the teleological
quality of these norms and their embodiment of, or relation to,
values. Finally, there is a factual dimension of law manifested
in conduct and institutions which express the legal ideas, and
in artifacts into which those ideas are read. Admittedly, there
are troublesome questions to be dealt with in connection with
the two latter, alleged properties of law, and there are many
subsidiary problems concerning, for example, the norms of subgroups and the sanctions of different types of norm. Nonetheless, the principal outcome of the suggested integrative theory,6
without further specification of the various steps, is that laws
are distinctive cultural facts. A rational-empirical discipline
is thus envisaged in which the political is not separated from
the legal except as convenience and the division of labor suggest
practical allocations of study.
This is not the place to argue the merits of the above and
other theories of law or to demonstrate that the bifurcation of
its form, value and fact in particularistic analyses of the data
has reflected and determined a corresponding separatism in the
relevant knowledge. The way to raise such controversies above
the level of verbal differences or merely preferential attitudes
is to be governed by the facts and qualities of most actual,
enduring power norms as they are revealed in history, and to
keep in mind, also, the requirements of a relevant social discipline
as distinguished from those of a formal science.
To evaluate theories of law it is also necessary to recognize
that definitions of law have been proposed in various contexts
6 The

writer has discussed this in "Integrative
jurisprudence",
published in
Interpretations of Modern Legal PhilosoPhies, edited by Paul Sayre (New York,
1947), p. 313, and in Living Law of Democratic Society (Indianapolis, 1949).
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and for different purposes. There is, accordingly, little to be
gained in asking in the abstract-"What is law?" Necessary
limitations on inquiry include the following. There is the
lawyer's definition of law, in which social practices, approval,
and ethical validity may be irrelevant because the lawyer's
purpose is to estimate the likelihood of governmental coercion
in particular situations. The question for theory in this connection is to discover to what extent avowedly scientific definitions of law, for example those of legal positivism, have been
unduly influenced by the needs of litigants, judges and lawyers.
Second, in debates on obedience to government, definitions of
law have emphasized conformity with, or inclusion of, moral
values as going to the essence of law. Obviously, strong preferences are often expressed in heated controversies. "Law",
originating in religious conceptions, has an honorific connotation;
hence the dissident and the subservient are apt to withhold the
term from power norms which they dislike. But the indicated
involvements do not free the social scientist from the necessity
to examine enduring power orders, especially those constructed
largely of customary law, where spontaneity and the tests of
long experience predominate, with a view to determining whether
value is an essential aspect of law for purposes of social science.
This has led us to the third type of definition, namely, that
providing an adequate description of positive law for the purposes
of social science. For the social scientist the patterns, r6les and
functions of law in society, the practices and effects exhibited
in law or produced by law are as important as the normativity
of the legal-political process. He approaches the data with
the models of science and those of less rigorous social knowledge
in mind, and he wants a definition of positive law which lends
itself to congruent purposes.
Viewed a priori, it may be thought that the theory of law which
he adopts is not important because, in any case, the social
scientist can investigate parallel or collateral factual and policy
questions. However, there seems to be a positive correlation
between the theory of law espoused and the kind of knowledge
that is sought. For example, is it mere accident that many
neo-Kantians have embraced logical positivism rather than social
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science? Indeed, they have maintained not only that legal
science must be rigorously separated from political and other
social science7 but also that the sociology and the psychology of
law merely confuse analysis by introducing unsound dualisms.
In contrast, the natural law philosophies, where the separation
of the idea of law from the why of it would be deemed irrational,8
have made lasting contributions to the ethical criticism of
political issues. And in legal sociology, where theories of the
nature of law take account of the factual dimension or effects
of law, it would be equally unsound to separate factual from
policy problems and to enclose each type in a hard, isolated
compartment. Because it has often done just the opposite of that,
legal sociology has made important contributions to social science.
Thus, it is quite likely, regardless of the bare logic of possible
directions, that there is a positive correlation between the theory
of the nature of law that is maintained and contribution to the
political discipline.
Perhaps the above observation will be disputed by pointing
to positivists among political and other social scientists who are
making important contributions but who have no theory of
law or, more precisely, whose theory is that law does not exist.
And what of the social scientists who seem to accept the theory
that law is only a concept or a verbal form whose incidence in,
or effect on, conduct, interpersonal relations, and institutions
is merely accidental? The difficulty of assessing the consequences of such theories of law or non-law results from the fact
that despite doctrinaire avowals, all of these scholars, just as
did the American Legal Realists, assume the existence of actual
functioning law (as norm) and its manifestations and effectiveness
in very large areas of political life. They do not articulate these
premises of their research and thus do not expose its incompatibility with the avowed theory of law.
Accordingly, it is possible to add relevance to many contributions phrased in terms of decision-making, the authoritative
7 Hans Kelsen, "Science and Politics", The American Political Science Review,
vol. 45, p. 641 (September 1951).
. . .no jurisprudence can hope for adequacy which separates the idea of
Harold Laski, Studies in Law and Politics (New
law from the idea of justice."
Haven, 1932), p. 259.
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allocation of values, formal organization, power, or "control
relationships of wills" by specifying the legal equivalents, assumptions and references that are implied throughout these
studies. Clearly, however, no organized political discipline can
be constructed so long as current nonlegal or antilegal perspectives operate. For, if legal theory which ignores the facts and
values of political institutions is an affair of sheer logic and brute
force, a political discipline which ignores law is apt to be an
aimless speculation.
The definition of the subject matter of the legal-political
discipline in terms of distinctive normative facts has important
implications for theory and research. It follows, for example,
that both the representatives of a strictly descriptive science of
politics and those of wholly intuitive knowledge of end-seeking
are correct in what they affirm but in error in what they often
reject. The opposition of the two approaches and types of
knowledge is an artificial one because each is suited to different
jobs and both are required to construct an adequate social
discipline whose subject matter includes distinctive coalescences
of fact and value.9 In sum, what goes on in legal-political
processes is also, to a significant degree, what ought to go on.
The theorist's functions thus include criticism of existing practices
and evaluation of suggested reforms. It is equally necessary
to describe the normative phases of political institutions in apt
terms representing insights derived from a sensitive reliving of
legal problem-solving by particular persons. It is also important
to pursue more rigorous scientific methods, for example, to correlate legal-meaning situations with other significant situations
and events.
Other notable consequences would flow from the union of
legal and political theory. Persistent interest in legal data
would open vast areas to social research which, in the present
state of world affairs, are the most important of all fields of
social investigation. And, as regards the advance of theory,
where else are there social data comparable to the legal materials
in precision, abundance, continuity in many cultures, availability
8 See the writer's Theft, Law and Society (Indianapolis,
1952), especially
discussion of the relevant social theory in the Introduction to this book.
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of records and contemporaneous interpretations of what happened and what was done?
Second, the articulation of the legal relevance of political
research would facilitate the progress of the discipline. Studies
of administration are given direction and they find points of
reference and standards in relevant rules of law-even when
adniinistration completely flouts the rules. So, too, many farranging researches in communication, propaganda, political
parties, voting, and leadership would attain definite theoretical
significance if they were formulated in terms of direct reference
to the sound legal solution of social problems, evidenced in
legislation, adjudication, administration, and enforcement.
Third, there would become available a body of legal concepts
which could be of considerable assistance in social analysis.
These concepts have in modern times been the principal interest
of the Positive School. But there is no reason for their being
so confined, for they comprise an ontology which has a very
long history, and it would acquire new, more significant meanings
if the legal concepts were thoroughly explored by social scientists.
A juxtaposition of legal concepts, such as right, duty, power,
liability, privilege, and political theories would stimulate speculation in promising directions, for example toward a nicer discrimination of power relations.
Many of the most important concepts-property, crime, tort,
contract, family, procedure, administration, public, and private-are discussed in Plato's Laws and their survival into the
present indicates that they do not exist in a vacuum but are
embodied in conduct and institutions which thus become distinctive facts. A critical reexamination of nonlegal discussions
of contract, property, liberty, and so on, in close contact with
available legal analyses could be illuminating. Other basic
ideas such as act, event, cause and sanction, and psychological
categories such as intention, recklessness, negligence and accident, have been critically explicated not only by Aristotle
but also in a vast legal literature in the context of efforts to
solve specific problems. It is not implied that this literature
can in its present character be lifted into a twentieth-century
legal-political discipline, but rather that its suggestiveness is of
paramount importance in the creation of such a discipline.
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Fourth, legal classifications represent important achievements
in systematization, which is rare in social science. Placed in
social contexts and interpreted imaginatively, these classifications might provide the groundwork for organization of the
legal-political discipline.'0 This does not imply that the laws
in the books are always actually and fully represented in conduct
and institutions. Indeed, the investigation of degrees of correspondence or divergence, of nullification, and of desuetude would
become a principal function of the political discipline. Nor
should it be assumed that the meaning of such basic conceptions
as "contract" and "property" has not changed through the
centuries or in relation, for example, to free enterprise and
centrally planned economies. There is a dynamics as well as a
core of fixed structure in legal meanings, and a cultural history
of their evolution would be an important adjunct to classifications of the data.
Fifth, in studies of laws and legal institutions, whose contents
and order exhibit unmistakable evidence of careful valuation
and other thoughtful activities, it is practically impossible to
confine theory to observable data and to generalizations regarding them. Even a high degree of sophistication could
hardly escape some notice of the purposes, uniformity and
impersonality of law and the rational functions of legal procedure.
No less prominent are the sustained efforts to achieve disinterested resolutions of conflicting interests"1although, obviously,
that is not the whole story of law. Any formulation of the
relevant value problems must therefore include the more subtle
aspects of problem-solving, especially the sacrifice of some values
in order to preserve or attain others. This implies the defense
of "right law", not as a mere preference, but on objective grounds.
It also implies the exclusion of behaviorism and crude operationalism, although empirical investigation of the external aspects
of legal-political data becomes especially significant precisely
10 The writer has discussed this and related problems in "Some Basic Questions
Regarding Legal Classification for Professional and Scientific Purposes", Journal
of Legal Education, vol. 5, p. 329 (1953).

11 "Law means precisely a judgment of right and wrong...."
John Dickinson,
"Social Order and Political Authority", The American Political Science Review,
1929).
vol. 23, p. 616 (May-August
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when and because they are viewed in relation to the nonobservable components of the normative subject matter.
Three types of unification of political and legal theory have
been suggested in the above discussion: (1) unification of the
thinking of the theorist, exhibited in uninhibited investigation
of legal-political problems, that is, investigation which does not
assume that eternal verities are embodied in current allocations
of certain data, ideas and theories to a particular discipline or
specialty. Stated objectively, unification here is in terms of a
problem. It means working with whatever knowledge and
methods are relevant to the solution of a legal-political problem,
regardless of present disciplinary labels. (2) Unification includes organization of the knowledge, thus acquired. And (3)
this unification looks finally to a reordering and classification
of social science, rendered possible by the fact that the legalpolitical institutions and categories are the most inclusive of all
social categories and institutions. The supporting reasons are
factual and theoretical. That the legal-political institutions cut
across all of social life has been frequently observed."2 The
theoretical ground is supplied in the recognition and analysis of
legal-political data as coalescences of distinctive form, fact and
value. Since this means that all of science, logic, ethics and
ontology, that is, all knowledge, is relevant to the legal-political
field, the ultimate goal of the theorist who surveys that domain
is to construct a world perspective from his vantage point.
JEROME HALL
INDIANA

UNIVERSITY

12
"Law, in a word, is a general mode of action which ranges over all places
where a uniform rule is possible, and which touches, as it ranlges, every sort of
Barker, op. cit., p. 82.
thing...."
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